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ABSTRACT  
We model international tax competition allowing for agglomeration forces and 
heterogeneous firms. This provides a new perspective since a tax schedules have 
different effects on the international relocation decision of small and large firms 
(large firms are endogenously more sensitive to tax competition) and these 
decisions affect industry productivity in addition to the usual effects. The model 
allows us to study rate-lowering base-widening reforms. We show it is generally 
possible to design such a reforms that raises revenue without losing firms.   
JEL H32, P16.  
Keywords: tax reform, heterogeneous firms, agglomeration forces. 
 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
International tax competition has been an important concern for decades, but the heightened 
mobility of firms and technology – spurred in part by the rapid improvements in the quality 
and price of international communication – has drawn renewed interest.  
From the 1980s onward, one common response has been to cut corporate tax rates but widen 
the base to which it is applied. The United States, Austria, France, Finland, Germany, Canada 
and the United Kingdom have sharply cut the rates and widened the base of their respective 
corporate tax regimes between 1980 and 2003.
2 Some small European countries such as 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Greece have reduced tax rates with an unchanged tax base.
3  
                                                 
1 We thank seminar participants at CES-Ifo (26 October 2005), and Kobe (10 May 2008), as well as Dany 
Jaimov for excellent editorial assistance. The first draft was written while Okubo was a PhD student at the 
Graduate Institute supported by NSF Grant No. 100012-105675.  
2 The statutory tax rates have substantially reduced in many countries: the United States from 50 % in 1980 to 39 
% in 2003, Australia from 50% to 30%, Austria from 61%(in 1982) to 34% (in 2003), Canada from 45% to36%, 
France from 50% to 35%, UK from 52% to 30%, Germany from 62% to 40%, Ireland from 45% to 13%, and 
Japan from 53% to 41%. The present discounted value of depreciation allowances has widened in some 
countries:  UK from 100% (1980) to 73% (2003), Canada from 94% to 73%, France from 81% to 77%, Germany Tax and heterogeneous firms  2
It has been argued that this sort of reform mitigates distortions and spreads the tax burden 
more evenly (UK HM Treasury, 2003). Such reforms may also increase tax revenue. As 
Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002) show, in many OECD countries the effective corporate 
tax rates have fallen and tax bases (measured by the present discounted value of allowances 
available in plant and machinery) have substantially widened, while at the same time tax 
revenue collected has risen. 
It is also commonly asserted that such reforms are necessary to prevent the largest firms from 
leaving, a point that is easy to see. A broader base and lower rate has a larger impact on the 
effective rate of large firms, so the reforms’ impact on international relocation decisions 
varies according to corporate size, boosting the reforming nation’s attractiveness for large 
firms more than for small firms.  
The purpose of our paper is to formally study international tax competition in the presence of 
significant agglomeration economies and firm heterogeneity. The former allows us to 
consider a situation where big economies maintain higher taxes in equilibrium (Ludema and 
Wooton 1998, Kind, Midelfart-Knarvik and Schjelderup 2000, Andersson and Forslid 2003, 
and Baldwin and Krugman 2004). The later allows us to consider the differential impact of 
tax reforms by firm size and to examine the firm-level impact of tax reform – an issue that has 
recently been highlighted by empirical studies on the firm-size distribution of tax payments, 
which typical finds that tax is paid by quite a small number of firms and the payers are 
typically large firms (Baer, 2002; Shome, 2004; Auriol and Warlters, 2005).
4 
At the theoretically level, our framework opens the door to extensions of the international tax 
competition literature. In particular, it allows us to consider the implications of tax reforms 
(such as the rate-lowering-base-widening) that alter the effective tax rate paid be firms of 
different size/profitability. Obviously, such reforms cannot be fully explored theoretically in 
the classic international tax competition model which assumes homogenous firms. In 
particular, we show that allowing for heterogeneity permits a given tax scheme to have a 
different effect on the relocation decision of small and big firms, with the biggest firms being 
endogenously more likely to relocate in reaction to high-taxes. 
The inclusion of firm heterogeneity permits three extensions of the theoretical analysis of 
international tax competition. First, it allows the model to capture the very real-world concern 
that large/profitable firms find it easier to escape taxation. Second, it allows us to consider the 
revenue implications of reforms that tilt the size-tax-burden profile in a setting where firms 
can relocate to avoid taxation and some do so in equilibrium. This creates the smooth trade-
off between higher tax rates and keeping firms at home. Third, since firm-size is associated 
with firm-level productivity in our model (following that by-now standard approach in Melitz 
2003), tax reform has an impact on the average productivity of firms in each nation. In 
                                                                                                                                                          
from 76% to 71% and Australia from 71% to 66%. On the other hand, some small nations have kept the same 
rates over the twenty year period: 75% in Belgium, 78% in Switzerland and 73% in the Netherlands.  Note that 
the present discounted value is calculated for an investment in machinery and plant. See the data resource for 
detail: http://www.ifs.org.uk/corptax/internationaltax.zip.  
3 Ireland has widened its tax base by reducing deductions while leaving rates unchanged, leading to  increased 
tax revenue over the decade. 
4 For instance, as shown in Baer (2002) 0.4% of taxpayers account for 61% of total domestic tax collection in 
Kenya and 57% in Colombia. According to Shome (2004), large taxpayers account for 80-90 percent of the tax 
revenue in Asian and Latin American countries. To reflect this phenomenon, an attempt to widen the profit tax 
base is one of the most possible ways of raising tax revenue in developing countries.  A narrow tax base comes 
from higher opportunity costs and entry costs for small firms. Auriol and Warlters (2005) found that a 1% 
increase of the entry sunk cost increases the informal sector by 14% and suggested that reducing market entry 
fees in developing countries could enlarge their tax base. Tax and heterogeneous firms  3
particular, a rate-lowering-base-widening reform tends to bring the most productive firms 
‘back home’ and thus can raise average industry productivity as well as raise tax revenue.  
The inclusion of heterogeneous firms is not entirely new to the tax literature, since it has been 
already analysed by the important papers of Burbidge, Cuff and Leach (2004, 2006). Their 
model, however, is quite different from ours in that the former can be thought of as an 
extension of the basic tax competition model (perfect competition, immobile labour and 
mobile capital) which assumes that firm productivity differences are both firm-specific and 
location specific.  In our model, the source of firm heterogeneity is the exogenous distribution 
of firm-level productivity – due, for example, to firm-specific assets such as organisational 
capital, intellectual property, or tacit technological knowledge. In Burbidge et al., some firms 
have a comparative advantage in one country, while the other firms have it in the other. As a 
result, tax rates could be higher in one nation without driving out all firms – even with perfect 
competition. In their model, the firm-level-region-specific productivity differences create a 
quasi-rent that can be taxed up to a point without firms relocating away from the higher tax. 
This leads to spatial sorting whereby firms locate to exploit their own locational comparative 
advantage.  
The focus of Burbidge, Cuff and Leach (2006) is the study of tax regimes and the provision of 
public goods, rather than tax reforms and firm location with trade costs as in our model. A 
related paper is Haufler and Schjelderup (2000) which is a theoretical study concerning 
optimal tax systems in the presence of profit shifting in foreign direct investment (FDI) via 
transfer pricing. They suggest that the optimal tax reform is to reduce tax rates so as to 
prevent firms from shifting their profits to foreign nations when FDI is introduced.  
Our paper is organised in six sections. The next introduces the application of the basic model. 
Section 3 studies the impact of taxation on firm relocation. Section 4 explores implications of 
tax reform, and Section 5 considers the impact of globalisation (i.e. free trade). The last 
section provides our concluding remarks.    
2. THE HETEROGENEOUS MOBILE FIRMS MODEL 
This section introduces the basic economic model with internationally mobile heterogeneous 
firms. It is best thought of as a marriage of the Meltiz (2003) model and the ‘footloose capital’ 
model of Martin and Rogers (1995).  
2.1.  The footloose capital model with heterogeneous firms 
We work with a world consisting of two nations (North and South) and two sectors 
(manufacturing and the numeraire sector). Before turning to the equations, we discuss the 
basic intuition behind the forces that affect the location of industry in the absence of taxes. 
Most of the basic forces in the model are not directly related to the heterogeneity of firms. 
The manufacturing section is marked by Dixit-Stiglitz competition, increasing returns at the 
firm-level and trade costs. As is well-known from the international trade and economic 
geography literature, this combination of assumptions generates both agglomeration and 
dispersion forces. The agglomeration force stems from the fact that firms want to locate in the 
big market (other things equal) to reduce their trade costs. This agglomeration effect is 
countered by a dispersion force known as the ‘local competition’ effect. That is, while 
locating in the big market allows firms to save on trade costs, the presence of many firms also 
implies tougher competition. Since firm want to be far from their competitor (other things Tax and heterogeneous firms  4
equal), this is a dispersion force.
5 The location equilibrium is marked by an international 
division of firms that just balances the agglomeration and dispersion forces.  
Firm heterogeneity introduces new effects since the balance of agglomeration and dispersion 
forces varies according to firm size. The ultimate source of firm-level heterogeneity in our 
model is firm-level differences in marginal cost (productivity), which implies that firms with 
low marginal costs charge a lower price and thus sell more and earn higher operating profits. 
Since different firms sell different amounts, the balance of agglomeration and dispersion 
forces varies by firm size. In particular, the trade cost saving aspect of big-market location is 
especially attractive to big firms that sell a lot. Likewise, the competition-protection aspect of 
location in the small market is especially attractive to firms that sell little. The thrust of this is 
that large firms tend to agglomerate preferentially in the large region. In other words, the 
equilibrium tends towards a spatial separation of firms by size with the big market tending to 
have a disproportionate share of large, highly productive firms.  
This feature of the model is the key to our novel tax analysis, since it means that changes in 
the tax gap between the big and small markets will lead to changes in the spatial segmentation 
by firm size. We now turn to introducing the model more formally. 
2.1.1 Basic  assumptions 
The manufacturing sector (‘industry’) consists of firms that each produce a differentiated 
variety and compete in a monopolistic competition setting. The tastes of the representative 
consumer in each region are quasi-linear: 
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where CM and CA are, respectively, consumption of the composite of M-sector varieties and 
consumption of the numeraire-sector (good A). Here, σ > 1 denotes the constant elasticity of 
substitution between any two M-sector varieties, μ is the expenditure share of manufacturing 
goods, and Θ is the set of all varieties consumed.  
Heterogeneity in our model stems only from differences on the supply side. Each 
manufacturing firm requires a unit of capital as its fixed cost and uses only labour in the 
variable costs. However, firms have heterogeneous unit labour requirements. The marginal 
production cost for firm i is given by the wage rate ‘w’ times its firm-specific unit labour 
coefficient, denoted as ‘ai’. It may help to think of ‘capital’ as knowledge capital, i.e. each 
firm’s blueprint for producing its unique variety. The ‘ai’ is associated with the firm’s 
blueprint, so it is unaffected by the firm’s location choice (i.e. the unit labour input coefficient 
is firm-specific, not market-specific). Since all Dixit-Stiglitz varieties enter (1) symmetrically, 
we see that heterogeneity enters only on the supply side.  
Each nation’s endowment of labour and capital is fixed, as are all of the firm-level ai’s. To be 
concrete and to keep the analysis tractable, we assume each nation’s distribution of ai’s is 
described by the Pareto distribution: 
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5 That is, firms can use international trade costs as a partial shield from competitors located in the big market by 
locating in the small market. Tax and heterogeneous firms  5
Here ρ is shape parameter and a0 is the scale parameter, i.e. the highest possible a; we 
normalise a0 to unity by choice of units.  
Capital is internationally mobile while labour is not. Since each firm is associated with a 
particular unit of capital (a blueprint), capital mobility is synonymous with firm mobility.  
Trade in manufactures is subject to ‘iceberg’ trade costs in the sense that firms must ship τ > 1 
units of their good in order to sell one unit in the other nation.  
Since the main focus of the analysis is on the interaction between taxes and the location of 
industry, we make the numeraire sector as simple as possible. Specifically, we assume it is 
marked by constant returns, perfect competition, costless trade and that it uses only labour.  
The thrust of our analysis concerns the impact of taxes on firm migration. Since we do not 
want to conflate technology-driven effects on location with those of taxes, we assume the 
G[a] is identical for the two regions. Moreover, to avoid capital movement that is driven by 
unequal capital-labour ratios, we assume that the nations have identical capital-labour ratios 
even though North is bigger, i.e. North has proportionally more of both L and K, so nations 
differ only in size. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of a’s in North and South. The distribution in the North is 
G[a] K; in the South it is G[a] K
*, where K and K
* are the North’s and South’s endowment of 
capital (i.e. mass of blueprints/varieties). This means that the total mass of firms in the North 
and South are K and K*, respectively.
6  
Figure 1: Endowed distribution of capital and marginal costs in North and South. 
The wage rate in each nation is set in a competitive labour market, but the reward to each 
firm’s unit of capital is determined by the firm’s Ricardian rent, i.e. its operating profit. As a 
consequence, different firms will earn different rewards on their capital in equilibrium. As in 
Melitz (2003), the most efficient firms will earn the highest reward on their capital. Melitz 
(2003) shows that the aggregate level of capital can be endogenised such that the average 
reward to capital equals the discount rate, but allowing for this would unduly complicate our 
model. Instead, we take the nations’ capital stocks and G[a] as part of the nations’ 
endowments. 
2.1.2 Intermediate  results 
The presence of the simplified numeraire sector facilitates the general equilibrium analysis 
substantially. Constant returns, perfect competition and zero trade costs equalise nominal 
                                                 
6 Since we take the range of varieties to be continuous, we speak of the ‘mass’ of firms with a particular 
marginal cost. We assume that the mass is the same for every level of marginal cost (this is demonstrated in 








K*G[a]Tax and heterogeneous firms  6
wage rates across nations and we choose the units of labour such that w=w*=1.
7 This means 
that all differences in manufacturing firms’ marginal costs boil down to differences in their 
a’s. Moreover, firm relocation does not affect wages paid, so factor costs are never an issue in 
firms’ location decisions. 
As is well-known, Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition implies that the profit-maximising 











and that ‘mill pricing’ is optimal, so the price of variety-j in the other market is just τ  times 
the producer price pj.  
Utility maximisation generates the familiar CES demand functions in the manufactures 
sector.
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where B   can be thought of as the “per-firm demand” that firms take as given under Dixit-
Stiglitz competition; P is the usual CES price indices in the Northern market (Θ is the set of 
all varieties consumed).  
A second well-known property of Dixit-Stiglitz competition is that operating profit of firm-j 
equals 1/σ times the firm’s revenue.
9,10 The firm-specific revenue of a typical North-based 
firm in the Northern market is just the consumption given by (3) times that firm-specific 
price. Using similar calculations for operating profit earned on Southern-market sales, the 
firm-specific operating profits for a North-based firm is:  
(4)  
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where 
* ~
B  is the Southern market version of B
~
 in (3) and φ is the parameter that gauges the 
‘freeness’ of trade (recalling that 1-σ  < 0, φ ranges from zero when iceberg trade costs are 
prohibitive, i.e. τ = ∞, to unity when the trade costs are zero, i.e. τ = 1).  
Four features of (4) play important roles in the subsequent analysis. First, all firms earn 
positive operating profit in equilibrium (this is the reward to capital, i.e. Ricardian rent). 
Second, since (1-σ) < 0, the most efficient firms – i.e. those with relatively low marginal cost 
and thus with low relative prices – are the most profitable. Third, a North firm that finds it 
optimal to charge a producer price of p when it is located in the North would find it optimal to 
charge the same producer price if it relocated to the South (due to wage equalisation and the 
constant Dixit-Stiglitz mark-up). Thus its operating profit when located in the South is: 
(5)  
*1 * [] ( ) p pB B
σ πφ
− =+   
                                                 
7 This holds for all possible equilibriums only if the size difference between the nations is not too great; in 
particular, the small South needs to be big enough to accommodate all industry and still have some labour 
leftover to employ in the numeraire sector. 
8 Individual demand for a typical variety j is c(j)=p(j)
-σμ/Δ, where Δ≡ ∫p(i)
1-σdi and the integral is over all 
available varieties, μ is expenditure on all varieties. 
9 Given the iceberg trade cost, the consumer/producer price gap exactly offsets the gap between the quantity of 
goods shipped and the quantity of goods consumed. This is a well-known feature of Dixit-Stiglitz competition. 
10 A typical first order condition is p(1-1/σ)=wa; rearranging, the operating profit, (p-wa)c, equals pc/σ. Tax and heterogeneous firms  7
The difference is that being South-based, the firm adds the iceberg trade cost to its price in the 
Northern market but not in its price in the Southern market. Fourth, comparing (4) and (5), it 




B  are not identical.  
2.2.  Locational equilibrium with capital mobility but no taxes 
Firms’ locational responses to taxes are at the heart of the model, so it is useful to consider 
relocation tendencies in the absence of taxes. The key to a firm’s location decision is the firm-
level difference between operating profit earned when the firm is located in the North versus 
the South. Without taxes this is: 
(6)    
1* [] * [] ( 1 ) ( ) / ppp B B
σ π πφ σ
− −=− −   
Plainly the sign of the gap turns on whether the per-firm demand in the Northern market, i.e. 
B
~
, is bigger than the per-firm demand in the Southern market, 
* ~
B . These, in turn, depend 
upon the location of firms (trade costs implies that competition is somewhat localised). In the 
situation at hand, no firms have moved yet so the mass of firms located in the North and 
South are K and K* respectively. To calculate that P’s and thus the B
~
’s, we change variables 
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Using (2) to solve the Northern integral and its Southern counterpart, we get: 
(7) () ()
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where λ is a collection of parameters that is positive assuming a regularity condition, namely 
(1-σ+ρ) > 0, that ensures that the integrals converge.  
To sign the profit gap in (6), we use (7) and the fact that North is a scaled up version of South, 
so it has a share s of both world expenditure and world capital. Thus: 
*
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The inequality holds as long as the North is bigger, i.e. s > ½. Thus, in the initial situation 
where no firms have yet moved, the per-firm demand is larger in the big Northern market, i.e. 
B  >
* B  .
11 Intuition for this result (which is well known in trade theory) is simple. If E is 10% 
bigger in terms of expenditure than E* and there are 10% more firms located in the North, 
then the per-firm expenditure would be equal if there were no international trade. Trade evens 
out the differences in competition so although competition is somewhat tougher in the North, 
it is less than 10% tougher so per-firm demand in larger in the North with trade but immobile 
firms.  
To study relocation, we start from the initial situation without delocation, and allow 
capital/firm mobility. The trade literature has explored this issue extensively in the context of 
                                                 
11 Note that our assumption that the North is bigger, but is endowed with the same capital-labour ratio, means 
that E/K=E/K* (recall that E is proportional to the number of consumers in a market and this is equal to the 
number of labourers and thus the labour stock in each region). Consequently, we can use (7) to rewrite B as 
(E/λK)/(1+φK/K*) and B* as  (E*/λK*)/(φ+K/K*). Since 0<φ<1 and K>K* we see that B>B*. The fact that 
B>B* without relocation is, of course, the basic economics driving the Home Market Effect (Krugman 1980). Tax and heterogeneous firms  8
homogenous firms. There, the received wisdom is called the Home Market Effect (e.g. see 
Krugman 1980, and Davis and Weinstein, 1999, 2003), which notes that some of the firms 
will relocate from the small South market to the big North market. However, as firms shift to 
the big market, they produce a counterbalancing shift in local competition. The Northern 
market becomes more competitive and the South market less competitive. Relocation goes on 
until the operating profit gap is pushed to zero, i.e. B  =
* B  . 
When firms are heterogeneous as in our model, an additional question arises: Which firms 
relocate first? The key is to note that large firms sell a great deal more than small firms, so 
large firms are most interested in reducing trade costs. More formally, the profit gap in (6) is 
greater for more efficient firms that charge a lower price and thus sell more. Following the 
usual logic, the Southern firms with the most to gain move first, i.e. the largest, more efficient 
South firms are the first to relocate to the big Northern market.
12 The relocation ends when B   
equals 
* B   and all firms are just indifferent to their equilibrium location, but with a range of 
the most efficient Southern firms having moved to the North. Figure 2 shows the equilibrium 
distribution of firm efficiencies by market allowing for capital mobility. 
Figure 2: Geographic distribution of firm efficiency with free delocation 
What we see from the diagram is that free capital/firm mobility results in the North having a 
disproportionate share of the world’s industry, and a disproportionate share of the world’s 
most productive firms (i.e. those with low marginal costs).  
Formally, the range of firms that move northward is [0…aR] where aR is the threshold 
marginal cost defined by: 











Note that the B  ’s depend upon the E’s and the P’s. While the E’s are invariant to firm 
relocation, the P’s adjust. For example using the mill-pricing and the definition of the North’s 
CES price index: 
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12 For details see the analysis in Baldwin and Okubo (2006a,b).The basic idea is that if there are quadratic 
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Here the three integrals reflect, respectively, the local prices of Northern firms, the local 
prices of Southern firms that are now based in the North, and the prices of South-based firms 
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Solving this tells us that aR equals: 
(9)    
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where ‘s’ is the North’s endowment share of world expenditure and capital/firms.  
From (9) it is clear that for sufficiently free trade, i.e. φ near 1, aR will be 1, which means that 
all firms will have left the South (recall that a = a0 = 1 is the maximum marginal cost). To 
keep the analysis interesting, we restrict our investigations to φ’s less than the level of 
freeness that would result in all firms in the North. Simple calculation reveals that this 
threshold φ is (2 1)/{(1 )(1 )} s s φ −− − <1.  
We turn now to including capital taxation.  
3. CAPITAL TAXATION AND EQUILIBRIUM LOCATION OF INDUSTRY 
Large highly industrialised nations typically have higher tax rates than smaller poor, less 
industrialised nations. This section introduces capital taxation that reflects this outcome and 
sets the stage for consideration of the impact of tax reform. To simplify, the Southern capital 
tax rate is zero so the Northern tax rate can be thought of as the tax difference.  
The simple tax scheme we consider involves a flat capital-income tax rate t that is applied to 
capital-income beyond a deductible, D. The tax applies to all firms located in the North 
regardless of their nationality and the tax is collected on worldwide capital income. Note that 
each firm is associated with a unit of capital and capital’s reward is the firm’s operating 
profit, so we can think of our tax as a highly simplified corporate income tax.  
Taking account of t and D, the tax paid by a typical firm with marginal costs a that is located 
in the North becomes: 
(10)     ( ) { } [] m a x [] ,0 tax a a D t π =−  
Plainly the tax paid is increasing in the size of the firm (i.e. decreasing in its marginal cost, a); 
a sufficiently small firm (profits less than D) pays no tax at all. The implied marginal and 
average tax rates are illustrated in Figure 3.  
Given this tax scheme, firms choose their location based on their after-tax income, so the 
location condition with taxation will be: 
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Small firms (those with operating profits below D) compare operating profit without regard to 
tax while larger firms consider tax when choosing their location.  Tax and heterogeneous firms  10
Figure 3: Marginal and average tax rates by firm size. 
3.1.  Taxation without a deductible 
To fix ideas, we first work through the simpler case where D = 0. Recall that the North can 
charge a higher tax rate and not lose any of its firms, since the big market is characterised by 
agglomeration rents as in Andersson and Forslid (2003).  
Formally, the tax rate that prevents all relocation (so the number of firms in each market is 
fixed by the endowments K and K*) is: 
(12)  
* 0( 1)
nr t π π =−−   
where t
nr is the no-relocation tax rate. The aim is to analyses the trade-offs facing a typical 
high tax nation, i.e. a nation that can only raise its tax rate at the cost of losing some firms to 
tax-driven relocation. For this reason, we start with a tax rate that is somewhat higher than the 
rate that would lead to no relocation of firms.  
Specifically, consider a tax that is slightly higher than t
nr namely t
nr plus ε.  In this case, the 
post-tax profit gap 
* [] ( 1 ) []
nr at a πε π −−−  will be negative and some firms would move to 
the South to escape the tax which now exceeds the agglomeration rent in the big Northern 
market. The firms that have most to gain from leaving are the ones that sell the most and thus 
earn the greatest profits. To see this, consider what post-tax profit gap firms would face if 
none moved. By definition of t
nr, the post-tax profit gap, 
* [] ( 1 ) []
nr at a πε π −−− , equals 
[] a επ −  and so it will be negative for all firms. However, it is much more negative for the 
most efficient/profitable firms. This is why the most efficient firms will leave first. As these 
firms leave, they make the Southern market more competitive and the Northern one less, and 
the exodus continues until post-tax profits are re-equalised in the two regions for the marginal 
firm. 
More formally, all firms with a’s between zero and aL will move to the South to escape the 
tax, where this threshold is defined by 
1*1* 0( ) ( 1 )( ) LL aBB t a B B
σσ φφ
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Using the fact that North has a share s of both the world’s K and E, and defining the tax factor 
as T ≡ 1-t, we can solve for aR, i.e. the end of the relocation range: 
( )
()
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We take this as the starting point of our reform analysis since it reflects the typical situation 
where the large market has a tax rate set sufficiently above the small nation rate, so that some 
firms have relocated to escape the tax. At this point, the big Northern market faces a 
continuous trade off between raising the tax rate and losing more firms. Formally, the range 
of firms that relocate is those with a∈ [0,aR]; this range widens as t increases (i.e. T falls), as 
inspection of (13) reveals.  
3.2.  Taxation with a deductible 
Next we introduce a small deductible that alters the location decisions of all firms. Before the 
deductible, all firms would have preferred the North – but for the tax. With the deductible, 
sufficiently small firms pay no tax in North, so they clearly prefer being in the North. The 
range of such firms that escape taxation in either market consists of those with a∈ [aU,1] 
where:  
(14)  
1* () U Da B B
σ φ
− =+  
where we normalise K+K














Notice that the Ks disappear from the equilibrium B’s since firms separate spatially according 
to the level of their efficiency. All firms with a’s less than aL move to the South to escape 
taxation. All firms with a’s above this threshold move to the North to take advantage of the 
larger market. The firms big enough to be liable for taxation in the North are affected directly 
by the deductible and indirectly by the relocation that D induces (at the very least, the 
deductible induces all small firms to relocate to the North). For firms big enough to pay tax in 
the North, the new post-tax profit gap is 
* () Dt π ππ − −− , which can be written as 
{ }
1* () ( 1) ( 1 ) aB T T B T D
σ φφ
− −− − + − .  
It is important to note that firms will now not be indifferent to location even after all 
adjustment occurs. The term is curly braces will be negative
13 yet the (1-T)D term is positive. 
As a consequence, the post-tax profit gap will be strictly negative for firms with very low a’s 
but strictly positive for firms with high a’s. The threshold a that divides firms into those that 
prefer the North from those that prefer the South is: 
(15)   { }
1* 0( ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) L aB T T B T D
σ φφ
− = − −− −−  
Another way to phrase this outcome is to note that with D, the effective tax rate depends upon 
firm-efficiency, with the firm-specific rate rising with the firm’s efficiency level (i.e. rising as 
its a falls). The effective-tax-rate for firms with the threshold a is: 
                                                 
13 Before D > 0 was introduced, (13) indicated that the {B(T-φ)-(1-φT)B*} was zero. Since the deductible 
induces some firms to move to the North, B falls and B* rises, so the term in curly braces must be negative. Tax and heterogeneous firms  12






Firms that face an effective rate above this locate in the South since the advantages of 
producing in the large North are not sufficient to outweigh the tax. For firms facing effective 
rates below this, the North market is attractive despite the taxation.  
To summarise, we write: 
Result 1: Taxation with a deductible leads to spatial sorting; all firms that are 
sufficiently efficient move to the tax-free country while all others concentrate in the 
high-tax nation. The threshold is defined implicitly by (15). 
This spatial sorting has obvious effects on the average industrial productivity of the two 
nations. In particular, all the most productive firms have escaped Northern taxes by moving to 
the South.  
Result 2: The spatial sorting reduces the average productivity of firms in the taxed 
country and raises it in the other nation.  
Tax Base.    Firms that are sufficiently small pay no tax due to the deductible; the threshold 
size as characterised by the threshold marginal cost aU is defined by (14). Firms that are 
sufficiently large pay no taxes since they are located in the South, where the threshold size, as 
characterised by the threshold marginal cost aL is defined by (15). The Northern tax base is 
thus the range of firms with a’s between aL and aU. Tax revenue in the North is: 




a Tax revenue t a tD dG a π =− ∫  
where B and B* are defined as in (15).  
The location equilibrium and Northern tax base are illustrated in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Location Pattern in the Equilibrium.  
We next consider tax reforms including the current trends towards lower-rate-wider-base.  
4. WIDER-BASE-LOWER-RATE TAX REFORM 
To fix ideas, consider a tax reform that leaves unchanged the effective tax rate facing firms 
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(18)  
* 0[ ] [ ] [ ] L LL aa t a x a ππ =− −  
The reform is illustrated in Figure 5. Recalling that the tax base is determined by two 
thresholds, the threshold aU above which firms do not pay taxes since they earn too little and 
the threshold aL below which firms do not pay taxes since they are located in the South, we 
see that the Northern tax is only paid by firms that earn profits between D and π[aL]. It is 
immediately obvious from the diagram that this reform raises tax revenue without inducing 
any firms to relocate to the low-tax nation. More formally, this is obvious from (17) since the 
average tax rate rises on all the firms paying taxes (those with a’s between aL and aU) and it 
increases the range of firms paying tax since D falls. 
 
Figure 5: Rate lowering base widening reform. 
To summarise: 
Result 3: A rate-lowering with base-widening tax reform that keeps the effective rate 
constant on the marginal firm always increases tax revenue.  
More generally, we consider the location impact of changing the tax rate, t, and the deduction, 
D, separately. Inspection of (15) shows that we cannot find a closed form solution for a
L, so 
the analysis must be by implicit differentiation. Totally differentiating the location condition 
(15) with respect to aL, t and D: 
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As long as the tax is not too high, so that T-φ>0, the coefficient on daL is positive.
14 Again if 
the tax is not too high, some firms will be paying tax so we know aL is less than aU, so from 
(14) the coefficient on dT must be positive.
15 The coefficient on dD is also positive. 
                                                 
14 The term (1-T)D is positive, so  B(T-φ)-(1-φT)B* must be negative if the sum is to add to zero and since σ>1, 
the first term of the coefficient is negative; given the signs of dB/daL and dB*/daL, the second terms is also 
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Combining these results on the signs of the coefficients, we have: 




This says that raising the marginal tax rate will induce additional firms to relocate to the 
South to escape the higher taxes. Raising the deductible has the opposite effect since it lowers 
the effective tax rate on the marginal firm. Consequently, a lower marginal rate teamed with a 
lower deductible will attract more efficient/large Southern firms to the North while narrowing 
the range of small/inefficient non-tax payers. It is plain therefore that the inflow of southern 
efficient firms to the North induced by the tax reform could raise the average efficiency of 
Northern industry.  
Average productivity and revenue effects.    The most productive firms are in the low-tax 
South (Figure 4) so a Northern tax reform that lowers aL – i.e. that encourages some of the 
Southern firms to relocate to the North – will have the rather unexpected effect of raising 
average productivity in both nations. The reason is that the marginal firm with marginal cost 
aL would be the most efficient firm in the high-tax North when it moves, but would have been 
the lowest-productivity firm in the South before it moved. To summarise: 
Result 4: Tax reforms that induce relocation into the high-tax region increase average 
productivity in both countries.  
5. GLOBALISATION AND TAX REFORMS 
Our model provides a simple and amenable framework for considering a wide range of 
interactions and tax reforms. The previous section analytically proved that a specific, rate-
lowering-base-widening tax reform would raise tax revenue. Here we examine what happens 
to revenue when the tax scheme is unreformed in the face of freer trade (globalisation).  
One of the key points in Andersson and Forslid (2003) is that agglomeration forces produced 
taxable quasi-rents with the size of the quasi-rents varying with the level of trade freeness in a 
hump-shaped manner. The quasi-rents are low when trade was either very closed or very 
open, reaching their maximum at intermediate levels of trade freeness. Since the basic 
agglomeration forces are in effect in our model, we also see a hump-shaped variation in quasi-
rents, however, in our model firms relocate in reaction to such changes. In relocating, they 
alter the tax base and thus tax revenue. The net result is that globalisation – as measured by 
greater trade freeness (higher φ) – has a hump-shape impact on tax revenue for a given tax 
scheme (i.e. fixed t and D).  
Numerical simulation of the tax-revenue impact of freer trade is shown in Figure 6 for a 
constant t and D.
16 The bottom curve shows the impact for an initial level of D and t. Starting 
from a low level, a rise in trade freeness φ would increase the agglomeration rents in the 
North if there were no firm relocation to the Northern market. The incipient profit shift, 
however, induces more firms to move to the big, high-tax Northern market, so the net result is 
a wider tax-base and higher tax revenue as shown. Specifically, the offsetting relocation 
                                                                                                                                                          
15 Since 
1* ()0 U aBB D
σ φσ
− +− = , and  L U a a > , then 
1* ()0 L aBB D
σ φσ
− + −>  since σ>1. 
16 The parameters we choose for the simulation are σ=2, ρ=2, E=0.6, E*=0.4. The initial tax scheme involves 
t=0.3 and D=2; the reformed tax scheme involves t=0.2 and D=1. Tax and heterogeneous firms  15
implies that the level of profitability changes little in the North, so the tax base’s upper 
threshold, aU, changes little, but aL falls.
17  
The rising attractiveness of the North in the face of freer trade, however, begins to fade for 
levels of φ beyond the peak of the hump. This is where the agglomeration rents in the North 
would begin to decline if there were no offsetting relocation. As before, the relocation 
induced by the incipient change in profitability reduces the tax base and results in lower tax 
revenue. The figure shows φ’s up to the point where 1-t = φ.  Beyond this point, there is no 
advantage to being in the big, high-tax nation for any tax-paying firm, so the revenue drops to 
zero.   
It may be useful to step outside the model and conjecture that the forces at work in our simple 
simulation would result in tax rate changes that bear some resemblance to actual events. In 
this first phase of globalisation (the φ’s corresponding to the upward sloped part of the 
revenue curve), the Northern government might decide to raise the tax rate in reaction to its 
increased attractiveness. As globalisation proceeds even further, the Northern government 
finds it increasingly difficult to keep its tax rates high without losing firms and so decides to 
cut rates. Figure 6 also shows the same calculation for a reformed tax structure that involves 
smaller D and  t (top curve). Note that the upper limit for φ is now higher, but the revenue is 
everywhere higher for this wider-base-lower-rate scheme.  
Figure 6: Globalisation and hump-shaped tax revenue.   
One of the crucial features in our model is firm heterogeneity, so we briefly consider the 
impact of varying the degree of heterogeneity as measured by ρ. We focus on the impact of 
heterogeneity on the link between tax-rate cuts and tax revenue. The numerical results, shown 
in Figure 7, are generated for the same values as those in footnote 16.  
According to the well-known properties of the Pareto distribution, (2), firms become more 
heterogeneous as ρ falls.  What the diagram shows is that greater heterogeneity increases the 
responsiveness of revenue to rate changes. Intuitively, a low ρ means that a higher fraction of 
industry output and profits is concentrated in the hands of the most productive firms. Thus as 
the tax rate attracts more firms back to the North, it has a bigger impact on the tax base and 
thus on revenue. In short, in industries where firms are more heterogeneous, tax reforms are 
more effective in the sense of boosting tax revenue. 
                                                 
17 Freer trade affects both thresholds but has a much large impact on aL since aL depends upon the difference in 
profitability in the two nations, while aU depends only upon profitability in the North; see (14) and (15). 
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Figure 7: Firm heterogeneity and tax revenue. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper proposes a simple model in which agglomeration forces are present and firms are 
heterogeneous. Both extensions are useful in allowing the international tax competition 
literature to consider a broader range of effects than has hitherto been possible. The presence 
of agglomeration forces allows consideration of the international trade competition issues 
raised in Andersson and Forslid (2003) and Baldwin and Krugman (2004) in the context of 
identical firms. Allowing for heterogeneity permits a given tax scheme to have a different 
effect on the relocation decision of small and big firms, with the biggest firms being the most 
likely to relocate to escape high-taxes imposed in the big nation.  
The model provides a simple and amenable framework for considering a wide range of 
interactions. The policy experiments we conduct in this paper concern 1) the impact of a rate-
cutting-base-widening reform, and 2) the impact of freer trade (i.e. globalisation) on the tax 
competition. The model should also help inform future empirical research concerning the 
impact of tax reforms on tax revenue, firm location and average productivity using firm level 
data sets.  
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